The Economist
AI’s infrastructure boom is increasingly financed with debt rather than the cash flows of large technology companies. Borrowers linked to data centres issued nearly $850bn this year and carry more than $3trn of debt; listed neoclouds alone owe $100bn, nine times annual revenue, while only two are profitable. Financing now runs through bonds, special-purpose vehicles, chip-backed loans, leases and supplier commitments, making risks harder to locate. Nvidia and other strong firms provide guarantees, and most new bonds remain investment grade, which could absorb a moderate shock. Yet CoreWeave’s five-year yield has reached 15%, its interest bill consumes a quarter of revenue, and corporate AI spending has flattened since July. If demand stalls while borrowing costs rise, defaults could spread through asset managers, private-credit funds, insurers and the technology supply chain.
2026-10-18T20:19:28.296Z
The Economist
India’s central bank has arrested the rupee’s slide near 95 to the dollar by selling reserves, attracting diaspora deposits, restricting speculation and making legitimate hedging more expensive. The defence reflects the political sensitivity of depreciation as the exchange rate approaches 100, especially before elections in Uttar Pradesh. Yet the pressure comes from forces the Reserve Bank of India cannot readily reverse: capital is flowing towards foreign AI investment, American rates are high, Indian assets look expensive and dearer energy has increased demand for dollars. Reserves fell by about $50bn in September, while exporters, importers and remitters may alter transactions in anticipation of further weakness. Controls can also deter needed capital inflows. The bank has bought time, but defending an arbitrary threshold risks market liberalisation and its credibility.
2026-10-25T12:23:19.451Z
Financial Times
Britain is nearing the practical limit of raising revenue through its tax system. The overall burden remains below several large European economies but is heading for a postwar high, while property taxes are the OECD’s highest relative to output and VAT exceeds the OECD average. Reliefs, exemptions and abrupt withdrawals of childcare support and personal allowances create high marginal rates, discouraging work and encouraging avoidance. Labour’s promises not to raise income tax, National Insurance or VAT, and to hold corporation tax at 25%, push the government towards smaller, complicated measures. The IMF favours broader bases, fewer VAT concessions and a recurrent property tax based on updated values. Such reforms could raise revenue with fewer distortions, but their visible losers make them harder to enact than incremental increases.
2026-10-25T05:00:02.429Z
The Wall Street Journal
France has become the weak link in the bond sell-off. Its ten-year yield briefly passed 5%, net debt is forecast to exceed 111% of GDP and a deficit near 5% is outrunning nominal growth of at most 3%. As cheap bonds mature, refinancing at higher rates raises interest costs and future deficits; unwinding trades built around France’s yield premium can amplify selling. A credible path towards lower spending and eventual budget balance could ease pressure, but revenue already equals 52% of GDP, voters resist cuts and tax rises, and parliament is split into hostile blocs. France also borrows in a currency it cannot print. Crisis is not imminent, and the European Central Bank would probably intervene before panic. The harder question is whether any government can make adjustment durable.
2026-10-25T09:30:00Z